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COMMENTS
TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS: A NOVEL
APPROACH IN THE NEW MEXICO COURTS*
Since the days of McCulloch v. Maryland' and Owensboro National Bank v. City of Owensboro,2 national banks have been
regarded as immune from state and local taxation except as authorized by Congress. 3 Recently, in First National Bank of Santa Fe v.
Commissioner,4 (hereinafter cited as Santa Fe) the Court of Appeals
of New Mexico seemingly departed from this traditional viewpoint in
holding that the New Mexico gross receipts tax was properly imposed
upon fees received by a national bank for performing data processing
services for other banks.
To reach this conclusion, the court relied on two basic-and somewhat novel-arguments. The court reasoned that the rendering of
data processing services is outside the scope of the banking powers
specified in 12 U.S.C. § 24 and therefore the, receipts are not
immune from taxation under 12 U.S.C. § 548.' Additionally, the
court felt that since the tax was shifted by the Santa Fe bank to the
four banks using the services, the users are the "real taxpayers," and
therefore no burden has been imposed on a national bank.
To facilitate analysis, the court's arguments will be discussed in
three sections, beginning with a discussion of the arguments that the
Santa Fe bank is not the "real taxpayer." The second major section
of this comment questions whether data processing activity is outside
the scope of powers authorized to national banks, and the final
section is concerned with the court's conclusion that receipts from
activities outside the scope of national bank authority are not
immune from state taxation.
I.
INCIDENCE OF THE TAX
The "legal incidence" test has been sanctioned by the United
*First National Bank of Santa Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 460 P.2d 64 (1969).
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. Owensboro National Bank v. City of Owensboro, 173 U.S. 644 (1899).
3. Justice Black, speaking for the court in Agricultural Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S.
339, 340 (1968), cited McCulloch and noted that "A long line of subsequent decisions by
this Court has firmly established the proposition that the States are without power, unless
authorized by Congress, to tax federally created, or, as they are presently called, national,
banks."
4. First National Bank of Santa Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 460 P.2d 64 (1969).
5. Id. at 701,460 P.2d at 70.
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States Supreme Court. Under this test, a state may tax the federal
government or its instrumentalities if the legal incidence of the tax is
on an entity other than the federal government. 6 A most illustrative
application of this doctrine is found in Colorado National Bank of
Denver v. Bedford," in which the Supreme Court upheld a tax on the
bank's services of renting safe-deposit boxes. The Court held that the
bank's immunity should not preclude the state from imposing the
tax since the tax was added as a "separate and distinct item," and the
bank was required to pass the tax to the user of the services.
The New Mexico court cited ColoradoNationalBank as authority
for their holding the Santa Fe bank liable for the tax.' The Santa Fe
bank had entered into contracts with the four "user" banks to collect from them the amount of the gross receipts tax assessed; but the
Santa Fe bank was obligated to refund the amount collected for the
tax, if their appeal to the courts proved successful. From this arrangement, the court inferred that the burden would not rest on a
national bank and that "the four users are in fact the taxpayers." 9
This ruling is seemingly justified by language in Colorado National
Bank, supra, quoted in the New Mexico opinion:
The person liable for the tax, primarily, cannot always be said to
be the real taxpayer. The taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for
the tax itself. The funds which were received by the State came from
the assets of the user, not from those of the federal instrumentality,
the bank.... 10

This language suggests that the Supreme Court of the United
States will not invalidate a tax on services rendered by a national
bank, if the bank is not the "real taxpayer." The test for whether the
bank is the taxpayer is not supplied in this language, but the court
makes it plain that the test is not satisfied merely by showing that
6. The "legal incidence" test is discussed in a comment in 43 Notre Dame Lawyer at
448-49. The author cites language in National Bank of Detroit v. Department of Revenue of
the State of Michigan, 340 Mich. 573, 66 N.W.2d 237, 239 (1954), as a good illustration:
"Since the legal incidence of the tax does not fall on the purchaster of merchandise but
rather on the retailer, such purchaser, in legal contemplation, is not the taxpayer even
though the economic burden may be shifted to him." Examples from non-banking areas are
found in Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941), Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1
(1941), and James, State Tax Comm. v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
7. 310 U.S. 41 (1940).
8. First National Bank of Santa Fe. v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 704, 460 P.2d 64,
68-69 (1969).
9. Id. at 705, 460, P.2d at 70. The court also noted that the Santa Fe bank could
lawfully collect the tax from the users under New Mexico statutes [N.M. Stat. Ann. §
72-16A-6 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1969)], and that it is a common practice, although not an
obligation, for "the person responsible for the tax to pass it on to the buyer or lessee."
10. 310 U.S. at 52, cited by the New Mexico court in First National Bank of Santa Fe v.
Commissioner, 80 N.M. at 704, 460 P.2d at 69 (1969).
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the national bank may pass the tax on to the user. In the same
paragraph quoted by the New Mexico court, a stricter standard is set
forth:
The Colorado Supreme Court holds the user is the taxpayer. The
determination of the state court as to the incidence of the tax has
great weight on us and when it follows logically the language of the

act as here, is controlling. As the user directly furnishes the funds for
the tax, not as an ultimate consumer with a transferred burden but
by § 12 of the act as the responsible obligor, we conclude the tax is

upon him not upon the bank. (Emphasis added.)'
It is clear that the New Mexico court was satisfied with considerably less than a showing that the "user" is the "responsible obligor"
under the tax act. The language of the New Mexico statute authorizing the gross receipts tax seems to state plainly where the obligation
rests: the tax is "imposed on any person engaging in business in New

Mexico."' 2 (Emphasis added.) It would seem, therefore, that a
determination that the incidence of the tax is on the "four users"
does not "logically follow the language of the act,"'' unless the
contractual provisions between the parties or the "common practice"
of passing the tax to the buyer are somehow read into the statute.1 4
Either approach seems to overlook the plain meaning of the language, and sets the stage for problems which apparently were not
anticipated by the court.
According to the contract, the "users" were to repay the Santa Fe
bank for any tax lawfully assessed on account of the rendering of the
services. Thus, the parties agreed that the issue of lawfulness of the
tax must be determined before the liability of a "user" is established.
If the contract is "read in," therefore, it is clear that the burden has
not shifted until the tax has been held lawful. As Judge Spiess points
out, the New Mexico court has said in effect that the tax is lawful
because the burden has shifted, but the burden only shifts when the
tax is lawful!' s Moreover, if the court is forced to rely on the
11. 310 U.S. at 52-53.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-16A-4 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1969).
13. That such determination can be challenged is evidenced by the Agricultural bank
case, supra note 3. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held themselves bound by the lower
court's determination that the tax was on the vendor and not on the bank. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the essential question before the Court was "On
whom does the incidence of the tax fall?" A sales tax which was required'to be passed to
the consumer was held invalid as applied to sales to a national bank.
14. First National Bank of Santa Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 705, 460 P.2d 64, 70
(1969). It is not clear whether the court based its decision on the contractual arrangement
or the "common practice." To parties seeking to avoid tax liability on a given transaction
there would be little difference, however, since they could always include in their agreement
a provision to shift the tax to the buyer.
15. See Chief Judge Spiess's dissent, id. at 705, 460 P.2d at 70, 71.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

contractual provisions as the basis for their holding it would seem
that tax liability could be avoided entirely, if the parties do not
specify that the buyer is to compensate the seller for any tax imposed. The logical application of this reasoning would allow the tax
liability to be eliminated entirely by a contract provision always
placing the burden upon the immune party. 1 6
Although it is not likely that the "contractual provision" or "common practice" reasoning would be applied to all other factual situations which logically fall within the bounds of the Santa Fe decision,
it is not clear that "extreme results" will be avoided. In the present
case, one of the four "user" banks is a national bank;' 7 thus, it is
clear that whether the incidence of the tax falls upon the "seller" or
the "buyer" of the services, a national bank is being taxed. The court
has made no attempt to avoid this "extreme" result by ruling that
the "user" national bank is not liable for the tax. Were they to do so,
the tax liability of any federal instrumentality buyer in New Mexico
would be open to question. The court notes that it is a "common
practice" to pass the tax on to the buyer, even though the buyer is a
federal instrumentality.' ' If this means that the buyer is generally
considered the taxpayer since he ultimately pays the tax, sales to
federal instrumentalities should not be taxed. The future may bring a
reluctance by the court to rigidly apply this part of its holding. The
most reasonable approach is to disregard the "common practice"
discussion as dicta, and to enforce contractual provisions which shift
the burden of the tax only if they would not result in an avoidance
of tax which would otherwise be properly imposed.
II.
SCOPE OF ACTIVITY
The New Mexico court sets out a test for immunity, based on
"whether the activity or service is reasonably related or incidental to
the accomplishment of its bank functions."' I If this is a valid test, it
becomes vitally important to determine whether rendering data
processing services to other banks is within the scope of a national
bank's powers.
The powers granted to national banks are specified in 12 U.S.C. §
16. If a federal instrumentality sells under a contract which does not require the buyer to
repay the tax, but buys under a contract which provides that the buyer must repay the seller
for any tax imposed, this reasoning would dictate that the tax would be upon neither
transaction.
17. Listed among the stipulated facts is the finding that "the Bank entered into contracts
with four unaffiliated banks (three state and one national)..." First National Bank of
Santa Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 701, 460 P.2d 64, 65 (1969).
18. Id. at 705, 460 P.2d at 70.

19. Id. at 702, 460 P.2d at 67.
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24, including "incidental powers." 2 There has not been a clear
indication from the United States Supreme Court of the general
scope of these powers, 2' nor has any court yet specifically ruled
whether a national bank exceeds its power by performing data
processing services for others.2 2
Since the New Mexico court was not compelled by precedent to
decide that the services rendered were within a national bank's
powers, a ruling that the services were outside the scope of the Santa
Fe bank's powers could legitimately follow. Although the court's
opinion contains no detailed discussion of the factors which led to
that conclusion, the court's holding clearly assumes that the bank has
exceeded its power. Only in this way was the court able to
distinguish Santa Fe from the long line of cases holding national
banks immune from local taxation. According to the court, "none of
these cases involved the question of a tax upon fees or charges made
by a national bank for commercial services performed outside the
scope of its banking powers as authorized by Congress." 2 3
A plausible argument can be made to support the conclusion that
the Santa Fe bank was acting outside its authorized scope. 4 As
noted by the court, 12 U.S.C. § 24 enumerates the powers granted
to a national bank, and data processing is not among the powers
listed. The status of powers not enumerated is not always clear, but
20. Congress has granted a national bank the power "To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall
be necessary to carry on the business of banking." 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1940).
21. One commentator notes that although the "incidental powers" became part of the
federal statutes in 1864, "the Court has never really focused on the intent of Congress" in
including this language. R. Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National
Bank Services?, 86 Banking L.J. 3, 19.
22. In Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), the court noted that
the authorities are not in agreement on this issue, but no attempt was made to resolve it.
The court's holding was restricted to the question of "standing," reversing district court
rulings that an independent data processing company has no standing to challenge whether a
national bank may perform data processing services. The appellate court declined to
examine a bank's powers to enter into the data processing business: "We leave the resolution
of this conflict to future determination."
23. First National Bank of Santa Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 701, 460 P.2d 64, 66
(1969). A good review of the cases which have held national banks immune is found in a
comment in 1969 Utah L. Rev. 352.
24. The New Mexico court in First National Bank of Santa Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M.
699, 701, 460 P.2d 64, 66 (1969), relied on three facts to support its conclusions: "The fact
that the enumerated powers of a national bank do not include the performance of such
services for other banks, the fact that the Bank Service Corporations are expressly
empowered to perform such services for banks, and the fact that Congress has not limited
the taxation by a state of Bank Service Corporations, indicates [sic] to us that Congress
does not intend that the performances of these services may not be taxed by a state." The
court, thus, seems to assume that powers not specifically enumerated by Congress are
necessarily outside the scope of authorization and therefore outside the scope of immunity
which Congress has conferred.
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the United States Supreme Court has said that ". . . the measure of
their [national banks] powers is the statutory grant; and powers not
"2 s
conferred by Congress are denied.
It is also possible to argue that by enacting the Bank Service
Corporation Act, 2 6 Congress has entirely precluded national banks

from furnishing data processing services. By this act, Congress
authorized banks to unite by forming a separate data processing
corporation. As a separate entity, a Bank Service Corporation can
purchase data processing equipment and utilize it according to the
combined needs of the incorporating banks, thus providing the
opportunity for small banks to take advantage of the faster, more
efficient means of handling their business by utilizing equipment
which they probably could not afford on their own. By express
provision these Bank Service Corporations are prohibited from engaging in "any activity other than the performance of bank services
for banks." 2 The history of this provision clearly shows that Congress enacted it to protect private data processing firms from competition.8 In Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,2 the court indicated
that the prohibition against engaging in non-bank business "would be
largely illusory" if a bank member of the corporation could solicit
business on its own and pass it to the Bank Service Corporation. The
court went on to say that large banks which are not members of any
Bank Service Corporation should likewise be prohibited "or the
equalizing effect of the Bank Service Corporation Act would be
lost."

30

The better argument, however, probably is that data processing
activities are within the scope of the bank's "incidental" powers,
25. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934). In accord with
this principle are City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U.S. 262 (1934), and Downey v. City of
Yonkers, 309 U.S. 590 (1940).
26. 12 U.S.C. § § 1861-65 (1962).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1962).
28. The bill initially allowed Bank Service Corporations to engage in non-banking
business (up to 50% of their total volume could be non-banking business), but an amendment was deemed necessary "because the banks could use their own personnel, charge
merely out-of-pocket cost, and the unfair competition could drive businesses now offering
this kind of service to the wall." 108 Cong. Rec. 22031 (1962) (remarks of Senator
Proxmire). See also 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3878 (1962).
The National Society of Public Accountants was "very much opposed" to the original bill
because of the likelihood that Bank Service Corporations would, in an attempt to utilize
their equipment fully, take business from accounting firms. 108 Cong. Rec. 16499 (1962).
Senator Robertson, who sponsored the bill, was opposed to the amendment limiting Bank
Service Corporations to only banking activities; and his statement of acquiescence leaves no
doubt as to the reason for its enactment: ". . . the acceptance of this amendment will carry
out the recommendations of the accountants." 108 Cong. Rec. 22099 (1962).
29. 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969).
30. Id.at 1153.
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consistent with rulings of the Comptroller of the Currency. 3 1 The
provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 24 set out the "classic banking functions,"
but nowhere do we find a specific grant for the day-to-day functions
which national banks perform. Looking to case law for an indication
of the breadth of these day-to-day, or "incidental" powers, we find
that the concern of the Supreme Court with regard to incidental
banking activity is not that competition may result, but whether
engaging in the activity would result in a substantial risk to the
bank. 3 2 In the absence of a substantial risk to the bank, there seems
to be no tendency to narrowly restrict a national bank in its incidental activities.3 If commercial banks, in general, engage in an
activity, it is not likely that national banks will be precluded from
engaging in the same type of activity. 3 4 This principle seems reasonable when applied to the facts of the Santa Fe case. Since other
commercial banks are free to engage in data processing for their
customers, to hold that national banks cannot do likewise places
national banks at a competitive disadvantage. It would be a questionable policy that would enforce certain discrimination merely because
the alternative raises the possibility that other private business might
be injured. 3 A more reasonable approach is to allow national banks
to compete, legitimately, with other banks, until it is shown that
current supervision is unable to prevent national banks from taking
unfair advantage of their federal status.
31. Beatty, supra note 21, at 5 reports that 3500, Comptroller's Manual for National
Banks, U.S. Treasury Department states: "Incidental to its banking services, a national bank
may make available its data processing equipment or perform data processing services on
such equipment for other banks and bank securities."
32. In First National Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 92 U.S.
122, 127 (1875), the Court said that the incidental powers are "such as required to meet all
the' legitimate demands of the authorized business, and to enable a bank to conduct its
affairs, within the general scope of its charter, safely and prudently."
33. In Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 377 (1954), the Court held
that national banks may advertise, under their incidental powers, stating: "We cannot
believe that the incidental powers granted to national banks should be construed so
narrowly as to preclude the use of advertising in any branch of their authorized business."
34. Beaty, supra note 21, at 19, after carefully reviewing cases dealing with the scope of
a national bank's "incidental powers," concluded that ".... an activity which is reasonably
related to the traditional activity of commercial banks will be approved, even if, in itself, it
represents a totally new function. A significant limitation is usually imposed on this rather
permissive standard; however, the new activity must not entail any substantial risk to the
bank."
35. Nowhere in the history of the Bank Service Corporation Act is there an indication
that Congress felt that the private accounting firms needed protection from national banks
themselves. National banks are primarily engaged in banking, not data processing. They are
subject to the Comptroller's supervision; and, as the report of the committee indicates,
Congress relies on the Comptroller to insure that national banks do not use their privileged
status unfairly. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 3878 (1962).
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IlI.
LOSS OF IMMUNITY

Federal instrumentalities established by Congress are initially presumed to be wholly immune from state control, unless contrary
intent is demonstrated. 3 6 This presumption is of minimal effect,
however, when Supreme Court interpretations indicate that some
control is permissable. As noted by the New Mexico court, tax
immunity is an area in which some control by the state is permitted.
In general, immunity has been narrowly restricted, and doubts have
been resolved in favor of imposing the tax.3 The difficulty arises,
however, when this "general" principle is applied to the specific
question of taxation of national banks.
The provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 548 grant states the power to tax
national banks in four ways, 3" and the overwhelming case authority
has made it clear that the states have no power to tax national banks
36. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 360 (1966).
37. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U.S. 493 (1882) cited in the court's opinion in
First National Bank of Santa Fe. v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699,702, 460 P.2d 64, 67 (1969).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 548 reads:
State taxation-The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject
to the provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the
shares of national banking assoications located within its limits. The several
States may (1) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in
the taxable income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations
on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net income,
provided the following conditions are complied with:
1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above four forms of
taxation shall be in lieu of the others, except as hereinafter provided in subdivision (c) of this clause.
(b) In the case of a tax on said shares the tax imposed shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state coming into competition with the business of
national banks; Provided, that bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness in the hands of individuals not employed or engaged in the banking or
investment business and representing merely personal investments not made in
competition with such business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within
the meaning of this section.
(c) In case of a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of
an association, the taxing State may, except in the case of a tax on net
income, include the entire net income received from all sources, but the rate
shall not be higher than the rate assessed upon other financial corporations nor
higher than the highest of the rates assessed by the taxing State upon
merchantile, manufacturing, and business corporations doing business within
its limits: Provided, however, That a State which imposes a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of, or a franchise or excise tax on,
financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations organized
under its own laws or laws of other States and also imposes a tax upon the
income of individuals may include in such individual incomes dividends from
national banking associations located within the State on condition that it also
includes dividends from domestic corporations and may likewise include
dividends from national banking associations located without the State on
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outside these statutory provisions.' 9 A vigorous attack on the doctrine was recently repelled by the Supreme Court. In the course of
the opinion, the Court made it plain that the grant of taxing power
to the states is exclusive,4 and that this interpretation is not to be
changed without Congressional action. 4' Since there is nothing in
the language of § 548 which might be interpreted as granting states
the power to tax national banks on their ultra vires activities, and the
states are without power to reach the assets of national banks
through taxation unless § 548 authorizes them to do so, it follows
that engaging in activities outside the scope of the banking function
should not subject a national bank to a tax from which it would
otherwise be immune.
The interpretation that § 548 grants the only means for a state to
tax national banks results in discrimination against state banks, 4 2
since they must pay a tax which their national counterparts do not.
Moreover, this interpretation has long been recognized as less than
logical. 4 It has withstood vigorous attacks, however, and as the law
now stands, national banks are regarded as totally immune from state
tax, except as provided in 12 U.S.C. § 548. 4 4
condition that it also includes dividends from foreign corporations, but at no
higher rate than is imposed on dividends from such other corporations ....
2. The shares of any national banking association owned by nonresidents of
any State shall be taxed by the taxing district or by the State where their
association is located and not elsewhere; and such association shall make
return of such shares and pay the tax thereon as agent of such non-resident
shareholders.
3. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property....
39. Among the stronger cases are: Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339
(1968); Des Moines Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923); and Owensboro National
Bank v. City of Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899). For a thorough review of the cases
holding national banks immune from state taxation, see 1969 Utah L. Rev. 352.
40. Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 343 (1968).
41. "Because of § 548 and its legislative history, we are convinced that if a change is to
be made in state taxation of national banks, it must come from the Congress, which has
established the present limits." Id. at 346. The history of 12 U.S.C. § 548 is set out in detail
in R. Risks and B. Polichar, The Taxation of NationalBanks and Bank Fixtures: Inequitable
Methods, UnpredictableLaw, 40 S.Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1967).
42. "The status of sales to national banks is likely to prove a major bone of contention .... If the national banks are entitled to purchase data processing equipment free of
any sales tax burden, their competitive position vis a vis their state chartered rivals is greatly
enhanced." 13 Vill. L. Rev. 399, 405 n. 42 (1968).
43. Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the states possessed some powers to tax
national banks without running afoul of the Constitution: "This opinion does not deprive
the States of any resources which they originally possessed." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 at 436 (1819). Roger Traynor has criticized the theory that the states
derive their power to tax national banks from a Congressional grant, noting that this would
mean that "Congress has granted a power which is by the Constitution delegated exclusively
to the federal government or prohibited to the states by that instrument." National Bank
Taxation in California, 17 Calif. L. Rev. 83, 88 (1928).
44. According to one commentator, "The effect of the Agricultural Bank holding that
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Existing law shows a reluctance to separate national bank activities
necessary to their federal function from those which are not,4 s and
all functions are therefore immune from state tax. This relictance is
necessary, in many instances, since a distinction would be arbitrary
and unrealistic. In Santa Fe, however, the distinction can easily be
made. The activity of the Santa Fe bank is probably not outside the
scope of its banking powers, but it is clearly defined and reasonably
separable from the federal functions of the bank. Had the parties in
Santa Fe formed a Bank Service Corporation, the separate entity
thus created would have been subject to the tax. 4 6 The fact that
they chose not to do so should not preclude the imposition of a tax
which would otherwise be proper.
CONCLUSION
The holding of the New Mexico court that the gross receipts tax
was properly imposed since the national bank was not the "real
taxpayer" does not fare well under close analysis. As noted previously, the court seems to torture the plain meaning of the statutory
language and to provide for tax avoidance possibilities which have
not previously existed in New Mexico. Moreover, the "shifting of the
burden" argument does not adequately solve the problem presented
by the fact of this case that one of the "user" banks was a national
bank. If the burden has been shifted to the "users," as the court says,
it is clear that the "user" nationalbank is being taxed.
The proposition that performing data processing services for other
banks is outside the scope of a national bank's power has some merit.
The weight of authority would oppose restriction, however, when
such activity is commercially sound and perhaps necessary for efficient, competitive national bank operations. The only contrary views
arise in settings where the prime concern is "unfair competition."
Since no one in this case claimed that the function of rendering data
processing services is in itself harmful, it would seem unfair to conclude that national banks are now prohibited from rendering data
processing services for other banks. It should be noted that the New
Mexico court did not specifically rule that the Santa Fe bank could
the statute is not now subject to judicial interpretation is to make absolute the presumption

of total federal immunity of national banks." Comment, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 352.
45. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 758 (1824), Chief
Justice Marshall ruled that the private operations could not be separated from the

governmental functions since the "authority to participate in private profit-making activities
created a method of engrafting life upon the skeleton."
46. Arizona State Tax Comm'n v. First Bank Building Corp., 5 Ariz. App. 594, 429 P.2d
481 (1967), Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corporation, 298 Mass. 285, 10
N.E.2d 472 (1937).
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no longer perform such services, but only that the receipts from this
type of activity are taxable. The holding could therefore be limited
to its facts, and it should not be taken as authority for the proposition that national banks cannot render data processing services for
other banks.4 '
The major holding of the court that activities which are not
specifically enumerated in 12 U.S.C. § 24 are taxable seems contrary to
existing law; however, it is possible that the approach taken by the
New Mexico court might be the way to crack the shell of immunity
which now surrounds national banks. To hold that national banks
cannot perform data processing services for other banks is probably
unduly restrictive; however, taxing these activities seems to do no
more than to place national banks on equal competitive ground with
state banks and with "ordinary" taxpayers. Congress has clearly prescribed the method for banks to unite to accomplish their data processing function. 48 The only method authorized by the statutes provides for the formation of a separate entity which would not be
immune from state taxation, since the statutory immunity runs only
to national banks. The fact that banks do not follow the authorized
procedure should not allow them to claim an immunity to which
they would not be entitled had they followed the rules laid down by
Congress. The best approach, therefore, is to hold that transactions
in which a national bank furnishes data processing services to "user"
banks are not immune from taxation, not because national banks do
not have authorization to render data processing services, but because transactions of this type are authorized by Congress in statutes
which do not grant tax immunity.
Tom Dailey

47. Even if national banks are precluded from engaging in "the data processing business,"
it does not follow that the Santa Fe bank is barred from serving other banks. Since small
banks can lawfully form a Bank Service Corporation to process their data, it is clear that the
prohibition in 12 U.S.C. § 1864 will never serve to protect private accounting firms from
competition if the customers are banks. Thus, since it cannot be said that the Santa Fe bank
is competing with private accounting forms, the major force of the ultra vires argument is
diminished.
48. 12 U.S.C. § § 1861-65 (1962).

